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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-4595 
 ___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
MICHAEL G. RYAN, 
   Appellant 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civ. No. 3-94-cr-00127-001) 
 District Judge:  Honorable William J. Nealon 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for a Decision on the Issuance of a Certificate of Appealability  
and for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to  
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
February 24, 2012 
 Before:  SLOVITER, FISHER AND WEIS, Circuit Judges 
 (Opinion filed: March 12, 2012) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 In 1995, Michael G. Ryan pled guilty to several federal drug trafficking and 
money laundering offenses.  Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Ryan was sentenced to 
twenty years of imprisonment, five years of supervised release, and ordered to pay a 
$200.00 special assessment.  The plea agreement further provided that Ryan was not 
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required to pay “the costs of prosecution, imprisonment, probation, or supervised 
release.”  (Judgment, Dist. Ct. dkt # 185.)   
 On July 5, 2011, after fifteen years of extensive post-conviction litigation, Ryan 
filed in the District Court a “Motion for Clarification” of the terms of his plea agreement.  
In the motion, Ryan alleged that, on May 11, 2010, the United States Federal Bureau of 
Prisons [BOP] attempted to coerce him into signing an agreement to pay a subsistence 
charge for part of the cost of residence at a Residential Reentry Center (RRC).  Ryan 
claimed that the terms of his plea agreement exempted him from paying this cost, and 
moved the District Court to “clarify” those terms to confirm his interpretation of the plea 
agreement.  The District Court denied the motion.  
 We will summarily affirm the District Court’s order.  For substantially the reasons 
given by the District Court, we agree that it did not have the authority to grant the 
“motion for clarification.”  First, contrary to Ryan’s contention, neither 18 U.S.C. § 3583 
nor Rule 32.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides a basis for the District 
Court to issue an order interpreting the terms of the 1995 plea agreement.  See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3583 (governing terms of supervised release); Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1 (governing 
procedure for revoking or modifying probation or supervised release).  Moreover, as the 
government noted below, Ryan previously challenged the BOP’s actions in a purported 
petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and was denied relief.  Ryan v. Scism, No. 11-cv-
00748, 2011 WL 2393493 (M.D. Pa. Jun. 13, 2011), aff’d Ryan v. Scism, 445 F. App’x 
580 (3d Cir. 2011).  Finally, to the extent that Ryan seeks clarification of the plea 
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agreement because he is “unsure if the government will try again, during the remainder of 
his sentence, to force him to waive those benefits of his plea agreement,” (Motion for 
Clarification, Dist. Ct. dkt # 331, ¶ 8), we note that his challenge is not ripe for judicial 
review.1  See Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (explaining that a claim is 
not ripe for adjudication if it rests on “contingent future events that may not occur as 
anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all”) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).     
 Accordingly, because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we will 
summarily affirm the District Court’s order.2  See Third Cir. L.A.R. 27.4.   
 
                                                 
1
 It appears that, since filing his Motion for Clarification in the District Court, 
Ryan began his term of supervised release.  He argues to this Court that he “remains 
exposed, during supervised release, to a breach similarly related to costs.”  (Arg. in 
Opposition to Summary Dismissal, p. 3.) 
 
2
 We deny a certificate of appealability as unnecessary.  
